From Physics to Chemistry: Rethinking Modern Social Science Through Scientific Paradigms

Before the 18th century, Western scientific thought was firmly rooted in Aristotle’s theory of causality, most notably articulated in his works Physica and Metaphysica. Aristotle categorized causality into four distinct types: causa materialis (material cause), causa formalis (formal cause), causa efficiens (efficient cause), and causa finalis (final cause). To illustrate, when constructing a table, the wood functions as the material cause; the table’s design or shape represents the formal cause; the carpenter is the efficient cause; and the table’s purpose, whether for dining or writing, is the final cause. Aristotle’s framework, deeply influenced by Platonic thought, placed immense weight on the formal and final causes. These latter causes, intrinsic to the essence and purpose of phenomena, stood in sharp contrast to the modern scientific emphasis on material and efficient causes, which reshaped the course of scientific inquiry.

A pivotal figure in this intellectual shift was Francis Bacon. In his 1605 treatise The Advancement of Learning, Bacon famously advocated that scientific investigation should limit itself to material and efficient causes, dismissing formal and final causes as too subjective and prone to human bias. This epistemological shift catalyzed the scientific revolution, which reached its zenith with the groundbreaking work of Galileo and Newton. The revolution inaugurated a new era of natural science, one that championed a mechanistic worldview focused on quantifiable, measurable phenomena.

In this modern scientific paradigm, the complexities of nature were reduced to mathematical formulations, governed by universal laws that could be quantified. A key aspect of this reductionist approach was its dismissal of “quality” in favor of “quantity.” Consider two laptops—perhaps a MacBook and an HP. While qualitatively distinct, we simplify our understanding by counting them as two units. This quantification is made possible by ignoring their inherent qualitative differences. Through this abstraction, modern science came to distill the intricacies of nature into precise, mathematical expressions. Thus, quality was sacrificed at the altar of quantification, heralding a profound shift in how we comprehend the world.

Isaac Newton, perhaps the most iconic figure of this revolution, epitomized this mechanistic view. He, along with his contemporaries, sought to harmonize the deterministic view of a mathematically structured universe with the belief in a divine creator, a worldview known as deism. The universe, under this lens, resembled a cosmic machine whose future could be predicted by understanding the forces and initial conditions of the present. This deterministic framework asserted that the present was shaped by past events, and in turn, would determine the future—a view that dominated Western thought for centuries.

This grand edifice of determinism, however, faced its first major challenge with the advent of Einstein’s theory of relativity. Einstein’s insights fundamentally altered the understanding of time and space, revealing them not as absolute entities but as interdependent dimensions within the space-time continuum. While this theoretical breakthrough challenged certain mechanistic assumptions, Einstein himself remained committed to a deterministic view of the universe. Yet, the unraveling of determinism did not truly begin until the emergence of quantum mechanics in the 20th century, which called into question the very foundation of classical certainty.

Quantum mechanics, with its inherent probabilistic nature, defied the deterministic causality long assumed by classical physics. While macroscopic phenomena appear predictable and deterministic, the microscopic realm—governed by quantum laws—exhibits uncertainty and ambiguity. Particles, such as electrons, simultaneously display characteristics of both particles and waves, defying simple categorization. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle encapsulates this, asserting that one cannot simultaneously know a particle’s position and momentum with precision. Schrodinger’s wave function further complicates this picture, suggesting that we can only speak of probabilistic states rather than absolute realities. In this framework, the deterministic causality that Newton championed becomes untenable, giving way to a probabilistic understanding of nature.

However, even within quantum mechanics, the role of entropy presents a further complication to the notion of causality. The second law of thermodynamics reveals the universe’s irreversible march towards disorder, or entropy. Once disorder increases, it cannot spontaneously revert to its original state. Ilya Prigogine, a pioneer in nonequilibrium thermodynamics, argued that this irreversible tendency towards entropy necessitates a reevaluation of deterministic causality. For Prigogine, the focus on quantification in modern science had obscured the importance of quality—the qualitative distinctions between different states of matter, energy, and systems.

Prigogine’s groundbreaking work in nonequilibrium thermodynamics offered a radical rethinking of scientific paradigms. He demonstrated that within states of increased entropy, new forms of order can spontaneously emerge. When observing a turbulent river, one might witness the formation of vortices—structures of order arising amidst chaos. These phenomena cannot be predicted deterministically but can only be understood retrospectively. Prigogine’s insight fundamentally challenges the deterministic view of nature as a linear progression from past to future, bound by fixed laws. Instead, he proposes a view of nature that allows for the spontaneous emergence of order, a process he termed “becoming.”

Further elaborating on Prigogine’s philosophical approach, we find a fertile ground for rethinking the underpinnings of social science. His emphasis on nonequilibrium thermodynamics and the spontaneous emergence of order from disorder offers a valuable framework to reconsider the deterministic and reductionist paradigms that have dominated much of social theory. Where traditional social science often seeks to distill complex human behaviors into quantifiable models, Prigogine’s insights prompt us to recognize the value in the qualitative, unpredictable, and emergent nature of social phenomena.

In the context of human societies, the parallel to Prigogine’s concept of nonequilibrium states becomes striking. Social systems, much like physical systems, are rarely in stasis. Instead, they are characterized by continuous flux, where tensions, contradictions, and conflicts drive the emergence of new social orders. Just as vortices arise spontaneously in a turbulent river, so too do social movements, ideologies, and political structures emerge from periods of intense societal upheaval. This implies that the trajectory of human societies is not merely a function of linear, deterministic progress but one of dynamic evolution, where unforeseen changes can catalyze the formation of entirely new systems.

The implications of this view are profound. It suggests that rather than focusing solely on deterministic models of human behavior, social science must also account for the unpredictable and emergent properties of complex social systems. Prigogine’s framework encourages us to embrace uncertainty as an integral aspect of social dynamics, where the future is not merely a projection of the past but a realm of possibilities shaped by the creative potential inherent in human interactions.

For instance, economic crises, much like physical turbulence, can be seen as moments of disequilibrium that give rise to new economic orders. The financial collapse of 2008, for example, revealed the limitations of existing economic models, which had largely failed to anticipate the systemic risks posed by complex financial products. In the aftermath of the crisis, new forms of regulation, economic thinking, and financial instruments emerged, reflecting the spontaneous evolution of economic systems in response to disorder. Economic systems, much like natural systems, are subject to transformations that cannot be captured by deterministic models alone. They reflect the fluid and dynamic nature of human behavior, which is shaped by qualitative as well as quantitative factors.

In the realm of governance and democracy, his ideas suggest that political systems are not static entities but are constantly evolving in response to social conflicts and tensions. New systems of governance and social order can emerge organically from turbulence and disorder. The conflict and disagreement that characterize political life may, paradoxically, create the conditions for novel forms of consensus and collective action. Rather than viewing political stability as the end goal, Prigogine’s perspective highlights the productive role of conflict and diversity in driving political innovation and change. In this sense, democracy can be seen as a system in constant nonequilibrium, where competing interests and values continually reshape the political landscape.

This perspective resonates with contemporary political theory, particularly the work of thinkers such as Chantal Mouffe, who argue that democratic politics is inherently conflictual. From this viewpoint, the political process is not about achieving a final consensus but about managing and channeling conflicts in ways that allow for the continuous emergence of new forms of political organization. Prigogine’s insights thus encourage us to embrace the unpredictability and dynamism of democratic politics, recognizing that the strength of democratic systems lies not in their stability but in their capacity to adapt and evolve in response to new challenges.

Prigogine’s approach to nonequilibrium thermodynamics provides a powerful lens through which to reconsider the foundations of social science. By emphasizing the importance of qualitative change, emergent order, and the creative potential of disorder, he challenges the deterministic and reductionist paradigms that have long constrained our understanding of human societies. The implications for social science are vast, offering new avenues for exploring the complex, dynamic, and often unpredictable nature of social, economic, and political systems. By acknowledging the interplay between disorder and spontaneous order, he invites us to uncover new ways of understanding both the physical universe and the intricate web of human interactions. This philosophical evolution presents an opportunity to transcend the rigid determinism of the past and venture into a more nuanced, dynamic understanding of reality. The potential for qualitative transformations in science, society, and economics remains vast and largely unexplored, offering fertile ground for future inquiry.